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CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
Constance Frisby Fain*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years or so, there has been a deterioration of the rules
that govern the conduct of corporate directors and officers, and other
professional groups. New rules are emerging which affect the duties and
liabilities of these professionals. Consequently, it has become difficult for
directors and officers to anticipate the parties to whom they will be held
liable for their own wrongful conduct and that of others.' Nevertheless,
safeguards have developed for the benefit of directors and officers, such as
indemnification statutes, 2 limitation on liability statutes,3 and statutes
authorizing corporations to purchase and maintain director and officer
liability insurance.4
Although there are many claims that may be brought against directors
and officers by shareholders and others, such as fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, federal security act violations, and RICO infringements,5 this
article will focus primarily on tortious misconduct, specifically professional
negligence and other tort causes of actions. This article addresses the scope
of duty, breach, causation, and damages; the various types of director and
officer misconduct that give rise to actions against them; and the diverse
defenses and protective devices that may defeat or limit director and officer
malpractice claims.
II. DEFINITIONS AND ROLES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
A corporate director is a person who has been "appointed or elected
according to law, [and is] authorized to manage and direct the affairs of a
corporation or company. The whole of the directors collectively form the
board of directors.",6 A corporate officer is one who occupies an office
* Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Houston, Texas. Advisory
Board Member of Butterworth Legal Publishers, Salem, New Hampshire. University of
Pennsylvania, LL.M. (1981) and Texas Southern University, J.D. (1974).
1. Kirsten L. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, Officers, and Directors: Annual
Survey, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 376 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, Liability of Professionals].
2. A discussion of indemnification statutes follows infra VII.A. See also Theodore
D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability,
23 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 902-23 (1993) [hereinafter Turning Back the Tide of Director
and Officer Liability].
3. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 912-17.
4. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 917-23.
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). See also infra part VI.G.
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990). A director may be classified as an
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"which . . . [is] provided for in the corporate charter, such as president,
treasurer, etc., though in a broader sense the term includes vice presidents,
general manager and other officials of the corporation."7 A corporation is
"an artificial person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the
laws of a state."'
Despite the corporate directors' comparable fiduciary responsibility to
the corporation and its shareholders, some courts hold officers to a higher
degree of care than directors.9 The reason for this difference in the required
degree of care relates to the roles each plays in connection with the
corporation. The functions of the officers are to manage the corporation, to
oversee day-to-day operations, to prepare reports pertaining to financial and
other matters, and to prepare and analyze data to be presented to the board
of directors.'0 On the other hand directors in large publicly held corpora-
tions usually function as advisors to management and formulators of
corporate policy. Furthermore, the board of directors relies on the various
reports prepared by the officers. In a small corporation, directors exercise
considerable control over corporate operations."
III. STATISTICAL DATA
There has been a significant increase in the number of law suits filed
by shareholders against directors and officers. For instance, one study
inside or outside director. An inside director "is an employee, officer or major stockholder
of [the] corporation." Id. An outside director, on the other hand, is a "non-employee
director with no, or only minimal, direct interest in [the] corporation." Id. By comparison,
the standard of care applicable to inside directors has been held by the courts to be higher
than that of the outside director because the inside director's involvement in the day-to-day
operations of the corporation is greater. Thus, there is an inference
that inside directors have more knowledge and awareness of the management of
the corporation. Conversely, outside directors have less time to devote to the
daily operations of the corporation .... As a result of their lack of time to
become involved in the details of the corporation's business, outside directors act
in more of an advisory capacity, functioning in "a more general decisionmaking
and supervisory role."
Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 605, 620-21 (1987)
[hereinafter McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care].
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Id.
9. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 619 &
n.85 (citing Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958)). The Raines court
stated that "[tihe law imposes a high standard of conduct upon an officer or director of a
corporation." Raines, 228 Ark. at 1178, 313 S.W.2d at 808.
10. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 619-20.
11. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 619.
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revealed that shareholder actions against directors are escalating twenty to
twenty-five percent each year despite the fact that laws are generally more
favorable to boards of directors. Furthermore, Jim Newman, publisher of
a newsletter that addresses securities class actions, reported that plaintiffs
prevail in eighty to ninety percent of the cases by obtaining favorable
judgments or settlements. 2
Directors and officers have also experienced difficulty in procuring
liability insurance coverage. The cost of insurance has increased consider-
ably even though more things are excluded from coverage. Policy durations
have lessened, resulting in thirty, sixty, or ninety day coverage in many
instances. 3  Furthermore, deductibles have increased, policies are more
vulnerable to early termination, and coverage is not available at all for some
corporations.'4
IV. SCOPE OF DUTY AND BREACH
For about two-and-a-half centuries, courts have attempted to determine
the nature and standing of corporate directors and officers in order to define
their obligations.' 5 It was ultimately decided that directors and officers are
"fiduciaries who have a 'distinct legal relationship' with the corporation." 16
In their capacity as fiduciaries, directors and officers must comply with
duties of care and loyalty acknowledged and dictated by the courts since
around 1742."
This fiduciary duty that directors and officers owe to the corporation,
shareholders, and others"8 comprises two components: a duty of care and a
12. Life in the Boardroom, 1990 MGMT. REV. 16 (1990).
13. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 900 &
n.15.
14. Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, 40 VAND. L. REV. 600, 602 (1987).
15. See McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 605-
06.
16. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 606.
See also Constance Frisby Fain, Professional Liability, 5A PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, DAMAGES 135 (1991) [hereinafter C. Fain, Professional Liability]. A fiduciary
is "[a] person having [a] duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's
benefit in matters connected with such undertaking .... [;] a person having duties involving
good faith, trust, special confidence, and candor towards another." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). A fiduciary duty requires one "to act for someone else's
benefit, while subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other person. It is the
highest standard of duty implied by law." Id.
17. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 606.
See also, e.g., Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (1742)
(holding that "fidelity and reasonable diligence" are required of a corporate director).
18. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 385. See also, e.g., Harman
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duty of loyalty.' 9 Directors and officers may invoke the business judgment
rule, which has traditionally been treated with flexibility by most courts, to
safeguard their conduct.2"
A. Duty of Care
In a majority of states, the duty of care owed by directors and officers
to the corporation and its shareholders2 is "the duty to exercise 'the care an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances."' 22 The reasonable prudent person standard has been applied
to directors in several cases.23
v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974) (holding that under Kansas law, a director,
who was a trustee, was not liable for the financial losses of a loan and investment
corporation), aJffd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbouer, 807
S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990) (holding that no fiduciary duty was owed by bank directors to
partnership creditor where the creditor alleged negligence of bank directors in carrying out
professional obligations).
19. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 385.
20. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 385.
21. See, e.g., Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1178, 313 S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958) ("The
law imposes a high standard of conduct upon an officer or director of a corporation ...
[because] he has voluntarily accepted a position of trust and has assumed the control of [the]
property of others."); Graham v. Allis-Chambers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
("[T]he question of whether a corporate director has become liable for losses to the
corporation through neglect of duty is determined by the circumstances. If he has recklessly
reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected
cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through
inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of
liability upon him."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (upholding
imposition of liability on corporate director because of sufficient proof of gross negligence
on his part); Boeing Co. v. Shrontz, No. 11273, 1992 WL 81228 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 1992)
(noting that assertions of neglect and waste fall within duty of care claims against directors
and officers).
22. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 385 & n.32 (citing REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (a)(2)(1984)). See also FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281,
1310 (N.D. Ind. 1991) ("[T]he degree of care to which ... directors are bound is that which
ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances."), aff'd sub
nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993). Cf In re Farmers Co-Op of Ark. and
Okla., 53 B.R. 600, 602 (W.D. Ark. 1985) ("[F]ailure of a director to exercise diligence or
good faith resulting in a loss, may result in directors' liability for the loss.").
23. See, e.g., FDIC v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450 (C.D. II1. 1989); Harman v.
Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974) (applying Kansas law), affd, 520 F.2d 1333
(10th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Citation Mfg. Co., 266 Ark. 591, 587 S.W.2d 39 (1979); Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (stating the standards for an
action based on director neglect); Department of Banking v. Colbum, 198 N.W.2d 69 (Neb.
1972).
Corporate officers are normally generalists whereas directors are expected to possess
special knowledge, competence, and skill in view of the specialized position that they hold.
Thus, in the case of a director,
[Vol. 18
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Arkansas courts apply a higher standard of care than most other states.
In a leading case on the subject, Raines v. Toney,24 the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that corporate directors, by virtue of their voluntary acceptance
of a position of trust and authority over others' property are held to a high
standard of care. Where a person is both an officer and a director of a
corporation, the applicable standard of care has been determined to be even
higher than that imposed upon persons in a fiduciary relationship.
26
B. Duty of Loyalty
The conduct requirement under the duty of loyalty, which is the second
component of the traditional fiduciary duty, parallels that which is required
under the duty of care. The duty of loyalty obligates the director and officer
to "act at all times in the best interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers and not engage in self-dealing."27 Total loyalty to the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders is crucial and necessary; 28 therefore, in
addition to self-dealing, bad faith and fraud on the part of an officer or
[a]s a general rule, a director should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding
of the business of the corporation. Accordingly, a director should become
familiar with the fundamentals of the business in which the corporation is
engaged .... If one "feels that he has not had sufficient business experience to
qualify him to perform the duties of a director, he should either acquire the
knowledge by inquiry, or refuse to act."
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981). See also Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 945,
951 (1990). [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Duty of Care].
Arkansas imposes a higher standard of care--even higher than the standard owed in
a fiduciary relationship-upon corporate officers who are also directors. See Raines, 228
Ark. at 1178, 313 S.W.2d at 808.
24. 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958).
25. "The law imposes a high standard of care on an officer or director of a corporation
... [because] he has voluntarily accepted a position of trust and has assumed the control of
property of others." Id. at 1178, 313 S.W.2d at 808.
26. See, e.g., Hall v. Staha, 314 Ark. 71, 79, 858 S.W.2d 672, 676 (1993) ("As officers
and directors, [the appellants] are held to an even higher [standard] than the normal and
demanding standards that apply to a fiduciary.") (citing Raines, 228 Ark. at 1178, 313
S.W.2d at 808).
27. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 385. See, e.g., Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d. Cir. 1984). Self-dealing is when one acts "out
of self-interest when one should be acting in the interest of another." WILLIAM STATSKY,
WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY 684 (1985) [hereinafter WEST'S LEGAL
DICTIONARY]. For instance, self-dealing "exists where [a] person in a fiduciary or
confidential relationship uses property of another for his own personal benefit." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990).
28. See, e.g., Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 278 (Del. Ch. 1986).
See also Jay W. Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability under Delaware Law, THE
BRIEF, Summer 1993, at 65, N.4 [hereinafter Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability].
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director are also recognizable claims based on the breach of the duty of
loyalty.2
Arkansas follows the common-law approach in determining the duty of
loyalty. In an early case, Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby,3" the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the duties owed by corporate directors to their
shareholders "in the absence of any statute, . . . must be ascertained and
controlled by common law rules applicable generally to such relations and
powers."31 Arkansas courts have also extended this duty to creditors of the
corporation.32 The duty owed by Arkansas corporations and corporations
that are licensed to do business in Arkansas is quite broad. However,
perhaps as a trade-off, neither an individual nor a creditor may bring an
action against a corporate officer or director for a breach of fiduciary
duty--the right to pursue such an action is specifically reserved for the
corporation, unless otherwise provided by statute.33
C. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a judicially-created presumption that "in
making a business decision the directors ... acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. ' 34 Consequently, boards of directors are protected
29. See, e.g., Colorado Mgmt. Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 359 P.2d 665
(Colo. 1961); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Shlensky v. South Parkway
Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (I11. 1960); Simpson v. Spellman, 522 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975). See also Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28. The
court in Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984), stated that "[d]irectorial interest exists
whenever divided loyalties are present, or a director either has received, or is entitled to
receive, a personal financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not equally
shared by the stockholders." Id. at 624, quoted in Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors'
Liability, supra note 28, at 65.
30. 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W..803 (1917) (holding that the common-law duties imposed
on natural persons in a fiduciary relationship apply with respect to corporate officers and
directors and the shareholders). See also In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 41 B.R. 476
(W.D. Ark. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Sacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
31. Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 435, 196 S.W. at 809.
32. Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 438-39, 196 S.W. at 809. The federal courts in Arkansas have
also recognized the State's rules of law concerning the duty of loyalty. In In re Farmers Co-
Op of Arkansas & Oklahoma, 53 B.R. 600 (E.D. Ark. 1989), the district court noted that
Arkansas courts have imposed a fiduciary duty on corporate directors "to the creditors and
shareholders of the corporation to exercise control of and [to] manage the affairs of the
corporation." Id. at 602 (citing Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 416, 196 S.W. at 803).
33. See Red Bud Realty v. South, 153 Ark. 380, 396, 241 S.W. 21 (1922). See also
Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (noting that Arkansas courts have
consistently held that the exclusive right against officers and directors resides in the
corporation unless statutes provide otherwise).
34. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), quoted in Turning Back the Tide
[Vol. 18
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from second guessing by the courts because of the presumption that they
have acted in good faith and complied with their fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.3"
The evolution of the business judgment rule occurred contemporane-
ously with the development of the duty of care concept.36  Although
individual courts have pronounced their own versions of the business
judgment rule, the rule essentially provides that "if any rational business
purpose exists for the directors' or officers' decisions, they are not liable for
errors in judgment when their decisions result in an unfavorable outcome for
of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 898.
Note that the business judgment rule does not provide "protection for directors who
have made 'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment."' Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985).
One writer has described the rationale upon which the business judgment rule is based
in the following manner:
First, by recognizing human fallibility, the rule encourages competent individuals
to assume directorships. Second, the rule recognizes that business decisions
frequently entail risk, and thus provides directors the broad discretion they need
in formulating dynamic and effective company policy without fear of judicial
second-guessing. The rule "recognizes that shareholders to a very real degree
voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment; investors need not buy
stock, for investment markets offer an array of opportunities less vulnerable to
mistakes in judgment by corporate officers." Third, the rule keeps courts from
becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making, a task which they are
admittedly ill-equipped to handle . . . . Finally, the rule ensures that directors
rather than shareholders manage corporations.
Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 898 n.6 (quoting
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS 6-7 (3d ed. 1989)). Furthermore, courts have acknowledged problems with
judicial review of corporate decisions. One court stated:
[A]fter-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business
decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily
reconstructed in a courtroom years later because business imperatives often call
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The
entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and confront uncertainty, and a
reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later
against a background of perfect knowledge.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), quoted
in Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 899 n.6.
For additional cases criticizing the judicial review of corporate decisions see, e.g.,
International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (I 1th Cir. 1989) (applying Florida
law); Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1174 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (applying Delaware law), cited in Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer
Liability, supra note 2, at 899 n.6.
35. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 898. See
also Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 65.
36. See McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 613;
C. Fain, Professional Liability, supra note 16, at 136.
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the corporation."37 With respect to the substantive quality of a director's or
officer's decision-making function, there are three elements that comprise
conditions for the application of the business judgment rule: (1) a decision
must have been made by the director or officer;38 (2) the director or officer
must not have stood to gain personally from the subject matter of the
decision;39 (3) the director or officer must have exercised informed judgment
in making the decision in that he was "reasonably informed" regarding the
decision.40
In making an informed judgment, a director or officer has an obligation
to make a reasonable investigation of the corporation's business and affairs.
A good faith belief in, or reliance upon, information provided by other
experts, attorneys, capable and knowledgeable inside officers, or other
external consultants is proof of a director's or an officer's adherence with
the duty of care.4
Arkansas's business judgment rule is statutory.4 2 Arkansas courts have
addressed the application of the standard of conduct for directors set out in
this statute and have stated that "[t]he rule is a rebuttable presumption that
directors are better equipped than the courts to make business judgments and
that the directors acted without self-dealing or personal interest and
exercised reasonable diligence and acted with good faith [in fulfilling their
duties]."'43
In determining whether the business judgment rule applies, Arkansas
courts employ a two-prong test to determine the appropriateness of applying
the above stated presumption to a corporate director or an officer. First, the
court inquires as to whether the director or officer is disinterested and
whether his conduct meets the statutory definition of business judgment.
37. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 614.
See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1945), affd, 155
F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
It has been expressed that "[t]he business judgment rule serves to uphold the decisions
of a board which acts 'on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the company."' NCR Corp. v. AT&T Co., 761 F.
Supp. 475, 491 (S.D. Ohio 1991), quoted in Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note
1, at 386.
38. See Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 959 & n.38 (citing A.L.I.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (c) cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985)).
39. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (c) cmt. d.
40. Id. § 4.01 (c)(2). Reasonable diligence is presumed to have been used in making
the decision. See, e.g., Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980);
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
41. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 386.
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-830(a) (Michie 1991).
43. Smith v. Leonard, 317 Ark. 182, 190, 876 S.W.2d 266, 270-71 (1994) (citing Hall
v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673, 678, 800 S.W.2d 396, 399 (1990)).
[Vol. 1 8
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Second, the court must determine whether the director or officer exercised
reasonable diligence in informing himself of all relevant information
reasonably available at the time the decision was made." Once the director
makes this showing, his actions are presumed to be in accordance with the
acceptable standard in business judgment, and the burden of showing
otherwise shifts to the complaining party.45
In making an informed judgment, a director or an officer has an
obligation to make a reasonable investigation of the corporation's business
and affairs. A good faith belief in or reliance on information provided by
other experts, attorneys, capable and knowledgeable inside officers, and
other external consultants is proof of a direcctor's or an officer's adherence
with the duty of care.46 For example, in NCR Corp. v. AT&T Co. ,'4 the
court considered a board of director's decision to approve a new employee
stock ownership plan implemented in an effort to defeat a competitor's
takeover. The business judgment rule failed to insulate the board of
directors from judicial inquiry because a completely informed decision had
not been made. Specifically, the board failed to request a "fairness
opinion," failed to examine thoroughly the tax and accounting changes,
failed to consider state law, failed to consider available employee stock
ownership plan options, failed to follow corporate procedure for adopting
such a plan, and failed to consider other data. In other words, the board
failed to comply with the requisite duty of care. 8
Another case,4 9 involving the business judgment rule concerned a
shareholder's derivative suit brought on behalf of a corporation against the
board of directors. The claimants alleged mismanagement of corporate
assets and breach of fiduciary duty. The court refused to defer to the special
litigation committee's recommendation that the corporation not pursue the
action against the board. The court's position was that the investigation
upon which the committee's investigation was based failed to satisfy the
requisites of a complete and reasonable inquiry. Consequently, the
defendants were not entitled to deference under the business judgment rule,
and their motion for summary judgment was denied.5
44. Smith, 317 Ark. at 190-91, 876 S.W.2d at 271.
45. Id.
46. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 386.
47. 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
48. NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 491-95 (S.D. Ohio 1991), cited in Thompson, Liability
of Professionals, supra note 1, at 386-87.
49. Davidowitz v. Edelman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aft'd, 612 N.Y.S.2d 882
(App. Div. 1994).
50. Id. at 344, cited in Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 387.
1996]
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The decision-making authority of directors was seriously diminished in
Smith v. Van Gorkom5' wherein the court confirmed the view that "the
concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining
whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an
informed one.,1 2 Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's application
of the business judgment rule in favor of the defendant directors. 3
The business judgment rule has been evaluated and recognized in cases
involving the duty of a passive director to act upon knowledge of the illegal
conduct of a fellow director who actively participated in the violation of a
statute,54 the fiduciary duty of a director to make an informed judgment
before responding to merger or tender offers,5 and suits involving directors'
and officers' good faith in making decisions in general. 6
Since the mid-1980s, there has been some deterioration of the business
judgment rule. Elevated judicial interference has threatened the traditional
51. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Smith involved a shareholders'
class action suit against a corporation seeking either rescission of a cashout merger of the
corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the corporation or, in the alternative, damages
from the corporate board. Id. at 863. The court held that the directors breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders
(1) by .. . [the directors'] failure to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the
Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such
as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to
approve the Pritzker offer.
Id. at 893.
52. Id. at 873.
53. Id. at 893.
54. See, e.g., Geygan v. Queen City Grain Co., 593 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
The Geygan court found a breach of duty by the passive director of the corporation, and thus
held that he was not entitled to insulation under the business judgment rule. Id. at 333.
55. See, e.g.,Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New
Jersey law); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Harriman v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., No. 65-C-1757, 1970 WL 237 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1970) (applying Illinois law), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972);
Selama-Dindings Plantations, Ltd. v. Durham, 216 F. Supp. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1963) (applying
Ohio law), afl'd, 337 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1964); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979).
See also Robert Roy, Annotation, Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise "Informed"
Judgment in Recommending Responses to Merger or Tender Officers, 46 A.L.R.4th 887
(1986 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Roy, Annotation].
56. See, e.g., Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 677
(2d Cir. 1984); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (applying Delaware law).
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protection afforded director and officer decision-making.57 Still the
plaintiff's burden of overcoming the rule's presumption of due care and
loyalty becomes almost insurmountable if the court finds that the rule
applies to the conduct of the director or officer being sued.5" In fact, the
successful application of the business judgment rule effectively exonerates
directors from liability for conduct that does not amount to a conflict of
interests, self-dealing, gross negligence, or fraud.59 Some courts appear to
favor the application of the business judgment rule over the conventional
duty of due care analysis.'
In brief, one writer has noted that due to the erosion of the business
judgment rule, a new rule may be emerging- "a management or directorial
duty to guarantee corporate success."'" The parties to whom this duty is
expected to apply may even include the general public or "unforeseen
persons impacted by a corporation's conduct.,
62
D. Breach of Duty
Although a corporate director or officer is generally bound to use due
care in carrying out his professional obligations to others, there can be no
negligent or wrongful conduct unless there is a breach of common law or
statutory duties. Where directors have not utilized available information
57. Turning back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 897.
58. Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 65, 68 n.2 (citing
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
59. See McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 615,
617-18. See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), af/d, 332 A.2d
139 (Del. 1975); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), affd, 316 A.2d 619
(Del. 1974).
60. See McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, supra note 6, at 615.
For judicial treatment see, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982); Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1982); Cramer v. General Tel.
& Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1978); Burton v. Exxon
Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying Delaware law); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar,
535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. 111. 1982) (applying Delaware law); Maher v. Zapeta Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (applying Delaware law); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. I11. 1969) (applying New York law); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation Inc., 360 So. 2d 884
(La. Ct. App. 1978); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (App. Div. 1984); Nursing
Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 535 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
61. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 390.
62. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 390. Note that this emerging
trend may be limited by other state laws, such as Arkansas's rules concerning who has




before arriving at a decision, courts have found a breach of duty.
63
Conversely, where directors have availed themselves of essential, relevant
information prior to making a decision, courts have found no breach of
duty.'
Regarding corporate waste and mismanagement, courts may impose
liability on directors when they negligently allow officers and employees to
mismanage or supervise the corporation's affairs.65 Where directors
erroneously rely upon officers or employees, courts may decline to hold
directors liable for harm caused by officers' and employees' defalcations,
poor supervision, or mismanagement of corporate affairs. Since the reliance
upon officers or employees is merely erroneous, there is usually no liability
imposed for errors of judgment engendered by neglect or breach of duty.66
Arkansas courts have held that a breach of duty that results in any loss
to the corporation may result in liability.67 Such liability may be imposed
without regard to whether the breach was intentional68 or unintentional.69
63. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stanley, 770 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (focusing on the
liability of interested directors versus noninterested directors for breach of the duty of care),
affd sub nom. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 1979); Geygan v.
Queen City Grain Co., 593 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (focusing on the duty of a
passive director to act upon becoming aware of a fellow director's active violation of the
law). See also Roy, Annotation, supra note 55.
64. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New
Jersey law); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133 (D. Del. 1975);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d
619 (Del. 1984). See also Roy, Annotation, supra note 55.
65. See, e.g., Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 417 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Liberty
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Foster, 737 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Taylor v. Alston,
447 P.2d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); Maxey v. Rodman, 444 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969). See also J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Liability of Corporate Directors for Negligence
in Permitting Mismanagement or Defalcations by Officers or Employees, 25 A.L.R.3d 941
(1969 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Rydstrom, Annotation].
66. See, e.g., FDIC v. Boone, 361 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Okla. 1972). See also Rydstrom,
Annotation, supra note 65.
67. In re Farmers Co-Op of Ark. & Okla., 53 B.R. 600, 602 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
68. See, e.g., Hall v. Staha, 303 Ark. 673, 681-82, 800 S.W.2d 396, 401 (1990) (holding
that director could be held liable for instituting a "double billing" procedure that might
subject the corporation to actions in the future); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1180, 313
S.W.2d 802, 890 (1958) (holding that corporate fiduciaries cannot, while still employed, start
a competitive enterprise or resign and take with them key personnel of their corporations for
the purpose of operating a competing business).
69. See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979) (imposing liability on
directors for the mismanagement of the bank president despite their reasonable belief that the
president was honest and competent); Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196
S.W. 803 (1917) (imposing liability on bank directors for the unsupervised acts of a teller
that resulted in a loss to the bank); Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 110 Ark. 39, 116 S.W. 134
(1913) (holding directors liable for losses bank incurred due to cashier's actions that were
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V. CAUSATION AND DAMAGES
As in all professional negligence cases, causation and damages must be
proved in order to subject the defendant director or officer to liability for
negligent conduct. The corporation must sustain a loss, and a causal
connection must exist between the defendant's breach of duty and the loss.
Consequently, a defendant director's or officer's neglect of duties concerning
corporate affairs must be a cause in fact and a legal or proximate cause of
the harm sustained by the corporation, its shareholders, creditors, or others
who may have claims against the defendant. Furthermore, the resulting
harm must be the normal, natural, and probable consequence of the
defendant's breach of duty.70
VI. CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY REGARDING VARIOUS
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Malpractice actions against corporate directors and officers are frequent
and varied. Regardless of whether such actions are based on professional
negligence or some other civil misconduct, it is evident that litigation
involving directors, officers, corporations, stockholders, and other relevant
parties will continue to grow. Claims by stockholders against directors and
officers are often in the form of a class action7' or a derivative suit.
Whether a claim is categorized as derivative or direct is based on the
allegations of the complaint, not how the claim is labeled by the plaintiff.72
A derivative suit has been defined as "a claim brought by a stockholder
suing on behalf of the corporation to redress injury inflicted directly on the
not discovered by the directors who were negligent in running the bank).
70. See generally Rydstrom, Annotation, supra note 65, §§ 15-16.
71. A class or representative action is:
[a] device by which a suit can be instituted by or against numerous persons whose
interests are sufficiently common that the dispute involving all of them can be
litigated in one action without joining everyone. One member of the class (the
named representative) represents everyone. Before a class action is allowed, the
court must be convinced that the class, although ascertainable, contains so many
persons that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court. It must
also be clear that there is a well-defined commonality of interest among the group
in the questions of law and fact involved in the dispute. Finally, the named
representative must demonstrate that he or she will fairly and adequately represent
everyone.
WEST's LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 137.
"This procedure is available in federal court and in most state courts .... The trial
court must also certify the lawsuit as a class action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (6th
ed. 1990).
72. Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 66.
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corporation itself, '7 3 such as an alleged depletion of corporate assets or a
decline in stock value.74 Conversely, an individual suit may be brought by
a stockholder seeking "damages if he or she alleges 'special injury,' which
has been construed as a breach of a stockholder's contractual rights."75 If
the stockholder prevails in his derivative suit, the recovery belongs to the
corporation because the harm was inflicted directly on the corporation. 6
A. Liability Regarding Duty of Care in Making Public Statements
Claims may be brought against directors or officers for making overly
optimistic statements and failing to correct prior public statements.
Therefore, if a director or officer makes an overly positive statement without
revealing significant company problems, thereby misrepresenting the
well-being of the business, then the corporation, the directors, and the
officers could be held liable based on negligent misrepresentation, fraud, or
federal securities violations.77 Similarly, if a corporation and its officials fail
to correct previous public statements concerning the condition and
prospective performance of the business, the investors may have a claim for
federal securities violations. 8
An interesting case arising out of Arkansas does not directly address
the issue of civil liability, but it does suggest that the Arkansas courts may,
in a proper case, impose liability for negligently making public statements.
In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee," the federal government
brought criminal charges against the five-member sewer committee, charging
that the committee publicly declared the proposed sewer plan complied with
federal statutes when, in actuality, it did not.80 The court found that the
committee's knowledge of the falsity at the time the statement was made
73. See Lipton v. News Int'l, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986), cited in Eisenhofer,
Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 68 n. 16.
74. See Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 68 nn. 18-19
(citing Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 353 (Del. 1988); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc. 542 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Del. 1988); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246,
249 (Del. 1970); In re Tri Star Pictures Litig., No. 9477, 1990 WL 82734 (Del. Ch. June 14,
1990); Elster v. American Airlines, 100 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. Ch. 1953)).
75. Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 66, 68 n. 17 (citing
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 542 A.2d 1182, 1188 n.10 (Del. 1988)).
76. See Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988), cited in
Eisenhofer, Officers' and Directors' Liability, supra note 28, at 66, 68 n.2 1.
77. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1991), cited
in Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 389.
78. See In re Meridian Sec. Litig., 772 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1991), cited in
Thompson, Liability of Professionals, supra note 1, at 389 & n.52.
79. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
80. Id. at 7.
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was the key factor in finding the committee guilty." Whether civil liability
may be imposed is still unanswered in Arkansas.
B. Liability Regarding a Director's Negligence in Allowing
Mismanagement and Defalcations by Officers and Employees
Careless and negligent directors who have allowed mismanagement and
misuse or embezzlement of corporate assets may be responsible for losses
sustained by the corporation. Not only is the corporation harmed, but the
shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties suffer harm as well.82
Some courts refer to corporate directors as trustees for their creditors in that
directors are held to a high standard in performing their duties of acting in
good faith and exercising diligence in handling corporate affairs in order to
safeguard the interests of the creditors.83 Therefore, directors may be liable
to creditors for negligence in allowing mismanagement or defalcations by
officers or employees.84
If a director becomes aware of signs of mismanagement or defalcations,
he is obligated to act reasonably under the circumstances from the time he
is put on notice of mismanagement or defalcation to prevent maladministra-
tion or misappropriation of funds by officers and employees in order to
avoid liability. 5 A director's indifference to his corporate responsibilities,
which results in mismanagement or defalcation, will also subject a director
to liability for negligence. However, the plaintiff must prove that the harm
was caused by the negligence of the director. If a director is merely a
figurehead, if an officer dominates the company's affairs, if an audit would
not have disclosed the misuse of funds, if there are no signals to create
suspicion of wrongful conduct, and if a director encouraged further
investigation which uncovered the mismanagement or defalcation, the
claimant may not be able to establish liability based on negligence. 86 By
contrast, directors and officers who act as mere figureheads, may be held
81. Id. at 9-10.
82. See generally Rydstrom, Annotation, supra note 65.
83. See, e.g., Hall v. Staha 314 Ark. 71, 79, 858 S.W.2d 672, 676; Raines v. Toney, 228
Ark. 1170, 1178, 313 S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958).
84. For cases concerning directors as trustees generally and others concerning directors'
liability to creditors, see, e.g.,, In re Farmers Co-Op of Ark. & Okla., 53 B.R. 600 (W.D.
Ark. 1985); In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., 41 B.R. 476 (W.D. Ark. 1984); Harman v.
Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974) (applying Kansas law), affd, 520 F.2d 1333
(10th Cir. 1975); Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990). See
also Rydstrom, Annotation, supra note 65.
85. See, e.g., Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 P.2d 952 (Kan. 1981).
86. See Department of Banking v. Colburn, 198 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 1972).
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liable for loss of corporate funds caused by their neglect of duty to prevent
or correct mismanagement or defalcations.8 7
C. Liability Regarding Negligence in Allowing Property of Third
Persons to be Converted by the Corporation
Although there is no privity between a director or officer and a third
person, courts may impose liability on directors and officers for their
negligence in allowing the corporation to convert the property of third
persons."8 The basis of liability may be ordinary negligence 9 or gross
negligence,9° and the alleged conversion may be committed by various types
of businesses such as banking corporations, investment corporations,
mercantile corporations, real-estate corporations, warehousing corporations,
and others.9'
D. Liability Regarding Issuance of Checks Against Insufficient Funds
A director or officer who participates in misdeeds perpetrated by or for
the corporation involving the issuance of corporate checks against insuffi-
cient funds may be held personally liable in tort.92 Courts that have
recognized or imposed individual liability have based their decisions on the
87. See, e.g., Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Western World
Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743 (D. Nev. 1985), affd in part and rev 'd in part on other grounds
sub nom. Buchanan v. Henderson, 131 B.R. 859 (D. Nev. 1990), rev'd, 985 F.2d 1021 (9th
Cir. 1993).
88. See, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Dunbar v. Finegold, 501 P.2d 144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Taylor v. Alston, 447 P.2d
523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); Loeffler v. McShane, 539 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 114 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1960).
See also E.T. Tsai, Annotation, Liability of Corporate Directors or Ojficers for
Negligence in Permitting Conversion of Property of Third Persons by Corporation, 29
A.L.R.3d 660 (1970 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Tsai, Annotation].
89. See, e.g., Loeffler v. McShane, 539 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 114 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1960).
90. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Finegold, 501 P.2d 144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
91. Tsai, Annotation, supra note 88. See also Dunbar v. Finegold, 501 P.2d 144 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1972); Taylor v. Alston, 447 P.2d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 114 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1960).
92. John D. Perovich, Annotation, Personal Liability of Officers or Directors of
Corporation on Corporate Checks Issued Against Insufficient Funds, 47 A.L.R.3d 1250
(1973), [hereinafter Perovich, Annotation]. See also Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 463 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ga. 1979); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 397 F. Supp.
649 (D. Ala. 1975), rev'd, 542 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1976); Meehan v. Adams Enters., Inc., 507
P.2d 849 (Kan. 1973); Jones v. Freeman's Dairy, Inc., 127 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 1954),
modified on other grounds, 129 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 1954); Viajes Iberia, S.A. v.
Dougherty, 212 N.W.2d 656 (S.D. 1973).
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directors' or officers' issuing, or consenting to the issuance of, checks that
they knew or should have known would not be honored by the drawee
banks when presented for payment by the payees.93
E. Liability Regarding the Duty to Monitor How Corporate Business Is
Being Conducted
Corporate directors have an obligation to oversee how the corporation's
business is being conducted and to remain reasonably informed of informa-
tion funnelled through the organization to the board of directors. 94
Ordinarily, this duty to monitor requires "installing or reviewing the
adequacy of procedures or techniques by which salient information
concerning the conduct of a corporation's business will flow to the board,
or to reliable executives or third-party professionals acting on the corpora-
tion's behalf and subject to the ultimate responsibility of the board." 95
F. Liability Regarding the Duty of Care in Performing the
Decisionmaking Function
Directors and officers are obligated to use due care and good faith in
carrying out their corporate decisions. Fairness and reasonableness as to the
substance of a business decision are relevant factors in determining due care
and good faith. Alternatively, bad faith may be evidenced by a decision that
is unreasonable, irrational, extreme, or motivated by personal gain.96
93. Perovich, Annotation, supra note 92. See also In re Turner, 32 B.R. 244 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983); Klockner v. Keser, 488 P.2d 1135 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); National Bank of
Commerce v. Hughes-Walsh Co., 246 So. 2d 872 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
94. See Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 951-52. See also Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) in which the court stated:
Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities
of the corporation .... Directorial management does not require a detailed
inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate
affairs and policies .... While directors are not required to audit corporate
books, they should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation
by a regular review of financial statements.
Id. at 822, quoted in Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 953-54.
95. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 952.
96. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 966-68. See also Selheimer v.
Mangonese Corp. of America, 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.





Other civil claims against directors and officers are based on the duty
of inquiry, or the duty to check out newly acquired information that signals
potential corporate problems;97 the duty owed by directors, officers, and
majority shareholders of closely-held corporations in acquiring the stock of
minority shareholders;98 tortious interference with the corporation's contract
with another;99 and director and officer responsibility under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) and its 1986 amendments (SuperFund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)).'0°
97. See Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 956-58 (citing Bates v. Dresser,
251 U.S. 524 (1920)).
98. See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying
Nebraska law); Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 327 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying
Illinois law); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (applying Wisconsin law);
Wheatherby v. Wheatherby Lumber Co., 492 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1972); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155
S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1967).
See also P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Duty and Liability of Closely Held Corporation, its
Directors, Officers, or Majority Stockholders, in Acquiring Stock of Minority Shareholder,
7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966 & Supp. 1995).
99. See, e.g., Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, 763 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del.
1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 1570 (3d Cir. 1992); Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co., 657
F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381 (Ala. 1986);
Payne v. Pennzoil Corp., 672 P.2d 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Miles v. Bibb Co., 339
S.E.2d 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176 (Md.
Ct. App. 1982); Burdett Radiology Consultants, P.C. v. Samaritan Hosp., 557 N.Y.S.2d 988
(App. Div. 1990); Threlkeld v. Christoph, 312 S.E.2d 14 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
See also Thomas G. Fisher, Annotation, Liability of Corporate Director, Officer, or
Employee for Tortious Interference With Corporation's Contract with Another, 72 A.L.R.4th
492, §§ 3-8 (1989 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Fisher, Annotation].
100. Robert W. McGee, Corporate Officer and Director Liability for Hazardous Waste:
Has the Law Gone Too Far?, 40 LINCOLN L. REV. 137 (1992). See, Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 276 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1994)); Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. For examples
of Superfund cases involving corporate directors and officers, see United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1057 (1990); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56 (D.N.H. 1984); United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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VII. LIMITATION MEASURES AND PROTECTIVE DEVICES FOR THE
CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
Since directors and officers have become more vulnerable to lawsuits
in recent years, many of which have resulted in liability, some measures
have been taken for the purpose of "encourag[ing] initiative in enterprise
decisions, encourag[ing] qualified persons to serve as directors,
encourag[ing] decision-making by independent directors, and giv[ing]
directors wide latitude in their handling of corporate affairs . . . ."' These
limitation measures and protective devices have been referred to as statutory




Delaware's indemnification statute, which has served as a model for
most states, empowers a corporation "to indemnify any director who has
'acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation.' 10 3 Parties to whom this
safeguard extends include "'any person who is or was serving at the request
of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint- venture, trust or other enterprise,"' if that
person 'was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any
threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding."" 0' 5 New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, for example, have indemnification statutes similar to that
of Delaware. 06
The enactment of these indemnification statutes has had the effect of
enlarging the range of actions for which indemnification could be provided
by the corporations.0 7 Moreover, there are three types of indemnification
approaches that are applicable to directors and officers that fall within the
ambit of indemnification statutes: (1) mandatory indemnification;' 0 8 (2)
101. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 902.
102. See generally Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note
2, at 902-23.
103. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 903
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
104. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 903.
105. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 903.
106. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 903 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 3-5 (1) (a) & (b) (West 1969 & Supp. 1992); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1741 (1967 & Supp. 1992)).
107. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 902.
108. Mandatory indemnification, which is automatic, is usually provided for in
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permissive indemnification;" °9 and (3) nonexclusionary indemnification."0
Most jurisdictions have adopted the nonexclusionary indemnification
approach or some modified form."'
Modem indemnification statutes are generally more flexible in terms of
providing advance payment of legal fees and other costs prior to final
adjudication of lawsuits against directors and officers." 2 However, such
statutes may include a provision requiring the director to make reimburse-
ment of advance payments in the event that it is decided that such payments
were not warranted."
3
In short, although indemnification statutes have certainly strengthened
the blanket of protection around the director and officer, at least two defects
have been identified. One flaw is the inability of smaller corporations to
indemnification statutes:
if a party has been successful on the merits or otherwise. In such a case, ...
[directors and officers] are not required to establish any of the necessary elements
for permissive indemnification, which include acting in good faith and in a
manner reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the corporation.
Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 904.
109. Permissive indemnification is usually provided for in indemnification statutes
covering derivative and third party actions.
Unlike mandatory indemnification, which is automatic, permissive indemnification
must be authorized on a per-case basis, and such authorization requires a finding
that the [party] has met the applicable standards of conduct. The requisite
standards for both third party and derivative suits are separately stated within each
statute, although they are similarly worded.
Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 905-06.
110. Nonexclusionary indemnification or statutory nonexclusivity commonly "permits
corporations to formulate their own programs for indemnification beyond the limitations of
the statute. A corporate program may be established pursuant to a certificate of
incorporation, shareholder resolution or a indemnification agreement or contract." Turning
Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 909. Statutory
nonexclusivity or some variation of this approach has been adopted in a majority of states
including Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Turning Back the Tide of
Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 909.
111. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 909 &
n.85-86, 88, 90, 93.
112. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 911.
113. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 911 &
n. 102 contain an example of Delaware's reimbursement proviso. Delaware's amended statute
provides:
Expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred by an officer or director in
defending any ... suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance
of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding upon receipt of an
undertaking by or on behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount if
it shall ultimately be determined that he is not entitled to be indemnified by the
corporation as authorized in this section.
Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 911 (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 1991)).
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afford to indemnify a director because of lower capital. Another flaw is the
failure of such statutes to excuse the personal liability of a director for a
breach of a duty of care despite the director's good faith."1 4
B. Liability Limitation Statutes
In view of the flaws in statutory indemnification statutes stated
previously, state statutes have been enacted empowering corporations to
adopt policies restricting or eliminating directors' and officers' personal
liability for "breaching their duty of care.""' 5 Delaware, for example, added
a liability limitation clause to its corporation law authorizing a corporation
to include in its certificate of incorporation or charter a provision
eliminating the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith of which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law, (iii) [for improper distributions], or (iv) for any
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit. " 6
Note that the preceding proviso only applies to directors, and the
stockholders of a corporation must approve such a proviso as an amendment
to the certificate of incorporation or charter. Delaware's statute is quite
popular and has served as model legislation for over thirty other states." 7
114. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 912.
115. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 912-13.
116. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care, supra note 23, at 970 & n.70 (citing DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988)). See also Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer
Liability, supra note 2, at 914-15; Eisenhofer, Officers'and Directors' Liability, supra note
28, at 68.
117. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 914 &
n.124 (citing directorial liability limitation provisos adopted by 32 states using Delaware's
statute as a model or paradigm).
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C. Alternative Insurance Methods
Indemnification statutes of almost all states allow corporations to
procure liability insurance for corporate directors and officers."' Again,
Delaware law has served as model legislation for most states which promote
the purchase and maintenance of insurance for directors and officers unless
restricted by public policy, as in the case of "willful or intentional
wrongdoing, fraud or knowing violation of law.""' 9 The Delaware statute
stipulates that "[a] corporation shall have the power to purchase and
maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent.., whether or not the corporation would have the power
to indemnify him against such liability under this section."'20 Although this
legislation permits the lessening or offsetting of indemnification by corporate
insurance funding, it is subordinate to state insurance laws that limit or
restrict coverage for certain behavior that is against public policy.' 2 '
Since directors and officers benefit from insurance programs in ways
that are not available through indemnification or liability limitation statutes,
more and more corporations are considering replacing conventional
commercial insurance policies or increasing their existing insurance
coverage.'22 Some alternative insurance methods employed by corporations
include captive insurance company agreements, insurance pooling arrange-
ments, fronting arrangements, trust agreements, and self-insurance pro-
grams."' Usually, one or more of the these alternatives are utilized in
combination with charter-provided indemnification or with a separate
indemnification agreement that contains specific contract protection for
directors and officers.
24
118. See Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 917.
Vermont was identified as a state that does not have legislation authorizing liability coverage
for directors and officers. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note
2, at 917 n.148.
119. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 917 &
n. 150 (citing public policy prohibitions).
120. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 917 &
n.149 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1983 & Supp. 1991)). For a comparison of
Delaware's statute to other state statutes see Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer
Liability, supra note 2, at 918.
121. See Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at
917-18.
122. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 919.
123. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 919-23.
124. Turning Back the Tide of Director and Officer Liability, supra note 2, at 919-20 &
n.168.
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D. Other Defenses
Limitations on director liability for mismanagement or defalcations by
officers or employees have been asserted to refute corporate losses where a
director was excused from the performance of active duties, where a director
relied upon officers or employees, and where a director relied upon other
directors.'25 If a director is excused from his corporate duties during the
time that the corporation experiences financial losses, he may be absolved
of liability for alleged negligence.'26 Furthermore, if a director relies on
officers, employees, or other directors, he may not be liable for alleged
negligence in permitting the wrongful acts of such persons.27
125. Rydstrom, Annotation, supra note 65, §§ 22-23 (citing, e.g., Harmon v. Wilibern,
374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974), ajfd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Taylor v. Alston, 447 P.2d 523 (N.M.
App. 1968); King v. Bullard, 643 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), affd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1982)).
126. See, e.g., Harmon v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
1333 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying Kansas law).
127. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Taylor
v. Alston, 447 P.2d 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968); King v. Ballard, 643 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 652 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1982).
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